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ABSTRACT

Research into the pre-Islamic Arabs has posited an autochthonous, maritime
tradition in Southern Arabia which provided the foundation for effective use of sea power
within the early Islamic state. Using historical and archaeological evidence, the existence
of such a tradition is reexamined within the broader cultural and historical context of the
area, with focus divided into three periods; that immediately prior to the birth of
Muhammad, that before the rise of Ptolemaic Egypt and that of the Mesopotamian CityStates, when southern Arabia was peripheral to the earliest organized civilizations.
It is concluded that although maritime resources were always utilized to some
extent, there was insufficient social, political or economic support to have allowed an
independent maritime tradition to have been developed in Southern Arabia.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: Introduction………………………………………….……………..…..1
CHAPTER 2: Southern Arabia on the Eve of Islam………………………………...…10
CHAPTER 3: Happy Arabia: Southern Arabia at Its Apex………………………..…22
CHAPTER 4: Up From the Sands of Time………….……………………………..…31
CHAPTER 5: Conclusion…………………………………………………………..…39
Flotsam………………………………………………....……………………..….39
Jetsam…..……………………………………………………………………..….43
Lagan...………………………………………………………………………..….52

REFERENCES…………………….……………………………………………….…56

iv

“I have heard that the Syrian Sea rises higher
than the highest thing on earth, and it seeks
Allah's permission day and night to spread
over the earth and drown it.
So how can I send forces over this
terrible Kafir? By Him Who sent
Muhammad with the truth,
I shall never send any Muslim upon it."
Attributed to Caliph Umar1

With this stark claim, Caliph Umar I, second of the Righteous Caliphs and leader
of the rapidly expanding Muslims, only recently spreading beyond their little known
peninsula, seemed to define his forces, his people, his ambitions and their future as
fundamentally terrestrial. Umar’s reluctance toward nautical endeavors probably
stemmed from early failures that the Muslims experienced at sea.2 These defeats, like that
of Al-Ala ibn Al-Hadrami in the Persian Gulf and Alqama ibn Mujazziz in the Red Sea,
could not have significantly hurt the Muslim forces as a whole, but considering their
overwhelming early success rate, perhaps any failure was felt out of proportion.
Regardless, Umar I’s definition was one which fit well within the western imagination of
the Arabians; a desert people of camels and caravans, sand and sun; “desert Bedouins of
inland areas” for whom the sea was, “an element with which they were at first neither
ready nor willing to cope.”3 Despite the fact that the Arabs soon spread from the center
of their Peninsula to hold dominance from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific, this view,

1

Seerah of Khalifas/Sahabah/Sahabiah, http://www.islamicstudies.info/history/khalifahs/umar.htm
(accessed May 7, 2015)
2
Aly Mohamed Fahmy, Muslim Sea-Power In the Eastern Mediterranean From the Seventh to the Tenth
Century A.D. (Cairo: National Publication & Printing House, 1966), 74.
3
Archibald Lewis, Naval Power and Trade in the Mediterranean, A.D. 500 – 1100 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1951), 54-55.
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which at its basest saw them as nearly hydrophobic and at best merely allowed that,
“Arabs considered it beneath their dignity to work as sailors,”4 certainly held sway for far
too long.
Happily, this one-sided view has since been recognized as both unrealistic and
naive. The Muslims were soon able to dominate extensive areas, for long periods of
time, and this would have been impractical without utilizing nautical resources.
Moreover, to effectively encounter other naval powers in the Mediterranean Sea and
Indian Ocean would have been impossible without utilizing some naval strategies and
techniques. Indeed, it is somewhat ironic that Umar I’s quotation above was, in fact, a
response for permission to engage in naval endeavors, a request which though
momentarily thwarted, would soon give rise to the first Muslim navy and successful
victories against the seaworthy Byzantines.
This second look at the maritime history of the Arabs has been a welcome
revision, yet as is so often the case, it has created just as much confusion as clarity. Part
of this confusion stems from the great periods of time and space involved in exploring an
issue as broad as, “Muslim Sea Power”. While it is now recognized that Muslim powers
utilized, and in some cases, dominated the seas over which they stretched their influence,
there is often little narrative offered to put these abilities in perspective, after all, ‘Muslim
Powers’ can define states ranging over three continents for a millennium and a half.
Several historians have focused on Muslim contributions in the Mediterranean however,
such works often look at cosmopolitan empires, where seafaring is an age old tradition,

4

George F. Hourani, Arab Seafaring, Expanded Edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 58.
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continued under various regimes. Taking a different approach, historians such as
Brummett and Casale have focused on the naval policies and projects of the Ottoman
Empire. While they have certainly demonstrated a great deal more interest in maritime
endeavor than may have been traditionally assumed, their emphasis on this relatively late
conglomeration of European and Middle Eastern, Turkish and Arab, Modern and
Medieval interests can hardly be seen as archetypical. Khalileh has produced a seminal
work on Islamic Maritime Law; however, he has merged hundreds of years of legal
thought from various parts of the globe into a single, short text which differentiates by
topic, rather than time or place. In short, while the reexamination of the Muslim powers
and the sea has led to some important and fascinating scholarship, its scattered approach
has done little to revise the view of the Arabs as a fundamentally land based peoples.
Work in this area has been largely dominated by a few authors who have attempted to
revitalize the concept of Arabs and the sea, as it were, from the ground up. These
scholars, notably Fahmy and Hourani have seen the Arabs themselves (rather than the
potentially all-encompassing ‘Muslims’) as important seafarers, in their own right, and it
is toward the work of these scholars that this paper is directed, for these authors attempt
to trace Arab seafaring back to its earliest, Pre-Islamic, autochthonous roots on the
Arabian Peninsula.
As a starting point, both authors noted above agree that for the ancient Arabs, the
sea, surrounding them as it did on three sides, was neither foreign nor particularly
daunting. Hourani notes that the Arabian Peninsula is a fundamentally harsh
environment in all respects and therefore communication by sea was, for its early
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inhabitants, “no more formidable than the crossing of the deserts and mountains.”5
Additionally, he notes that the, “desert is as trackless as the sea”6 and that it was probably
this environmental coincidence that encouraged the early Arabs to develop astral
navigation, as useful for crossing a featureless expanse of land as it would be on the
water. Fahmy, notes that the earliest Arabs recognized the rich potential of the sea and
utilized it for fish, pearls and coral.7 Moreover, he notes that although there is some
scholarly disagreement on the importance of such references, pre-Islamic poetry is replete
with allusions to maritime ventures, with travel aboard ships being often compared to
crossing the desert on camel.8
While in agreement then that the earliest Arabs were not shy of the sea, Hourani
and Fahmy soon diverge in the importance of the maritime world to the Arabs, and how
control was maintained over it. Fahmy stresses in particular that the important trade
between India and the Mediterranean was largely within their control. He notes that
although the Ptolemies were important in developing this trade, “they refrained from
encroaching upon the transport of goods by sea which the Arabs considered to be their
exclusive right.”9 He further adds that the Ptolemies limited their own maritime
involvement in this commerce to some minor boat crossings in the Red Sea, leaving the
Arabs control over the Indian Ocean, “master seamen who effectively barred imperial
trade between Rome and India along the sea route.”10 Even after Greek merchants
discovered the secret of the monsoon trade winds in the Indian Ocean around 45 A.D.,

Hourani, 4.
Ibid., 106.
7
Fahmy, 57.
8
Ibid., 50-51.
9
Ibid., 41.
10
Ibid., 42.
5
6
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“the Arabs were still masters of much of the trade and kept the upper hand.”11
Hourani, is more restrained in his celebration of Arab seafaring, largely restricting
any Arab influence to the Red Sea.12 Despite his acknowledgement of maritime ventures,
he considers the Red Sea, rife with troublesome winds, hidden shoals and ubiquitous
reefs, to have been so difficult and dangerous to navigate that the early Arabs avoided it
whenever possible. He supports this idea noting that the, “Arabs developed camel routes
along the whole western side of their peninsula,”13 apparently preferring the dangers of
the desert to those of the waves. While he agrees that Arabs gained substantially from the
ancient trade between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, he attributes the uniting
of these two great aquarian bodies to the Persians.14
While these two authors might disagree on the extent and strength of Arab sea
power then, there are a few important points in common. First, and foremost, “from time
immemorial...the coastal Arab had been a sailor and trader.”15 Second, the Arabs, as a
people, were never fundamentally afraid of the sea. Finally, while Fahmy places the
focus of Arab sea power in the Indian Ocean, and Hourani prefers the Red Sea, both
agree that the root of Arab maritime expertise arose in Southern Arabia, a land today
occupied by the countries of Yemen and Oman.
It is here then, that this paper begins its own course, for it seems undeniable that if
one is to seek the earliest stirrings of maritime endeavors in the Arabians, Southern
Arabia offers the best starting place16. Not only have previous historians found the
Fahmy, 43.
Hourani, 7.
13
Ibid., 5.
14
Ibid., 13.
15
Fahmy, 67.
16
The geographic term of Southern Arabia may require some clarification. In modern times, Southern
Arabia corresponds in large part to the contemporaneous states of Yemen and Oman. Indeed, ‘Yemen’ is
11
12
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champions of the Arab seamen here, the peoples of Southern Arabia seem to have formed
a coherently distinct people since the beginning of the historical record, allowing for a
relatively easy focus for research. Indeed, while the term ‘Arab’ itself has been traced
back to 835 B.C., it seems to have only slowly spread south, and it is not until the first
century A.D. that it seems to be easily applied to the peoples of the entire peninsula.17
This distinction was exemplified in the past through language, religion and culture, and to
some extent, still persists in modern perceptions and prejudices between northern and
southern Arabs.
Additionally, the location of a land which birthed several powerful, autochthonous
kingdoms immediately adjacent to two rich seas offers a geographically likely candidate
for early maritime endeavor. This likelihood is enhanced by Southern Arabia’s position
as a central point between the great civilizations of Ethiopia, Rome and Egypt to the west
and those of India and Persia to the east, presenting opportunities for large scale,
lucrative, long distance trade. Additionally, while Arabia Felix was certainly within the
sphere of influence of some of Antiquity’s greatest powers, it was also far enough away
for autochthonous traditions to arise and be maintained. Moreover, and in conjunction
with the above, the importance of maritime trade and resources to Southern Arabia is

an ancient appellation which in the Classical Age roughly corresponded to the area known to the Romans
as Arabia Felix16, renowned for its riches, in particular incense. This area was also the birth place of
several native kingdoms whose influence extended far beyond their small territory. Some caution is
required however, as ‘Southern Arabia’ also has a particular meaning in modern scholarship, where it is
used to distinguish this area from Eastern and Central Arabia. These areas have been established as the foci
of various disciplines, the former being the portion of the Peninsula bordering the Persian Sea and early on,
within the cultural sphere of the most ancient Mesopotamian civilizations, and the later rising to
prominence with the preaching of Muhammad and the spread of Islam. For the purposes of this paper,
Southern or South Arabia will be used to refer to the southwestern portion of the Arabian Peninsula and
will be freely interchanged with Yemen, or al-Yemen, unless otherwise specified.
17
Klaus Schippmann, Ancient South Arabia: From the Queen of Sheba to the Advent of Islam (Princeton:
Markus Weiner Publishers, 2001), 3.
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certainly borne out by later history, thus we need only seek a starting point for these
practices. Finally, it avoids many of the difficulties facing scholars of Islamic history in
distinguishing between the history of Arabs and Muslims, an issue often exacerbated by
the speed with which Islam spread as well as the mobility of the Arab peoples. However
distinct the peoples of Southern Arabia may have been, they were clearly recognized as
Arabs by the time of Muhammad, and amongst the first converts to Islam. In short,
Southern Arabia presents a fairly discreet geographic area for study, with both the
opportunities and resources to build a strong maritime tradition, ancient roots and
connections to the advent of Islam.
Yet if indeed a home of Arabian seamanship is to be found in the southern part of
the Peninsula, certain questions immediately present themselves to the careful historian.
One of the great turning points of Western History was undoubtedly the arrival of
Muslim/Arab forces in the Mediterranean Sea. If the Arab peoples were the expert
mariners that some seem to claim, then why, upon reaching the coast as part of their early
expansion, did the Arab commanders immediately turn to recently conquered Syrian and
Egyptian sailors to man their ships? Difficult as the Red Sea may be to navigate, its
tricky winds and dangerous reefs should only have prepared Arab sailors for the
comparative ease of Mediterranean sailing. Moreover, it would seem that any lack of
familiarity with Mediterranean eccentricities would have been sufficiently overcome by
being loyal participants in Muslim expansion rather than more or less hired hands.
Speaking to this point, in the earliest Muslim sea battles, and victories, it is well attested
that, “the sailors who were Copts, as distinct from Muslim warriors, appear to have taken
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no part in the actual struggle.”18 In such circumstances, it would appear that no
knowledge of naval tactics or combat methods would have been required but rather
expertise in mere seamanship. What then, indeed, happened to this supposed nautical
expertise?
To shed some light upon these questions, this work takes a different approach.
While earlier historians have combed through records, focused and expanded upon
tantalizing suggestions of seafaring Arabs, this work will instead look at the broader
context that both historical and archaeological evidence provides. This work then,
focuses less on the occasional reference to an Arab ship owner, but more on the Southern
Arabian world that such a ship owner would have lived in. In order to provide a
sufficient context for such a sweeping endeavor, it examines the maritime history of the
Southern Arabs in three, distinctive phases. Moving backwards through time, the first
spans the first century, B.C. up until the advent of Islam, and covers South Arabia’s
decline as an independent power in the face of Roman, Persian and Ethiopian influence.
The second section begins in the tenth century, B.C., and explores the rise of the great
South Arabian kingdoms and their trade networks which reached both east and west.
Finally, the third section deals briefly with the earliest archaeological record of human
inhabitants of the Peninsula, essentially examining evidence gleaned from Mesopotamian
sources suggesting that seafaring, at least in the general vicinity, was both common and
extensive. While this backward chronology is not the orthodox layout of historical
writing, its purpose is to allow each of these time periods to be treated with the greatest
sympathy toward the conclusions of Hourani and Fahmy, as well as others, for if a strong

18

Fahmy, 87.
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maritime tradition was present in Southern Arabia on the eve of Muhammad, there may
be reasons why it has garnered less space in the preserved memory of those times.
Moreover of course, if such a tradition is not found, this is not to suggest that it did not
exist previously. This paper thus goes further and further back, to discover what possible
maritime cultural existed in the region that may have been overshadowed by later events.
Ultimately however, I conclude that the cultural, social and economic development in the
Southern Arabian Peninsula never supported the rise of a maritime tradition. Instead,
geographical and historical circumstances existed which kept the people of Southern
Arabia fundamentally focused on terrestrial concerns, and thus while references to more
nautically inspired Arabs are accurate, they do not hint at the presence of a great maritime
tradition, but instead merely underscore the adaptability and resourcefulness of
individuals from this region.

9

Southern Arabia on the Eve of Islam
In many ways, the rise of Islam greatly redirected the focus of attention in the
Arabian Peninsula. Where the Bedouin tribes of the peninsula’s center soon became
known the world over as the founders of a new and powerful civilization, the classical
peoples of the region had long seen Southern Arabia as a power in its own right, a bastion
of civilization at the edge of an expanse of sand peopled only by barbaric nomads. The
Southern Arabia however, that merged with the rest of the peninsula as the inspiration of
Muhammad spread was not a confident and independent region, although the traces of its
former glory remained. For several decades prior to the rise of Islam, Southern Arabia,
had essentially been little more than a pawn in the constant battling of the Byzantine and
Sasanid states, becoming more or less a Persian vassal by around the mid-sixth century
AD. As a vassal state, the area retained a certain deal of autonomy, its dependent status
being primarily marked by the remittance of taxes to the Sasanid central authority
however, that Southern Arabia was a unique bastion of civilization is made clear by the
fact that whereas in other areas of peninsula, urbane Persia was content to rule through
client kings, its interest, and presence, in the Yemen was sufficient to have created a
ruling class of “abna, sons of Persian fathers and Arab mothers.”19
While far from independent, the Southern Arabia of this time was still a rich and
well- populated region. What is interesting from a maritime standpoint is that while the
sources of the time consistently note the importance of trade and commerce in Yemen,
there is little if any reference to the nautical aspects of this trade. Instead, what seems to

19

Abdullah al-Askar, al-Yamama in the Early Isalmic Era (Reading, United Kingdom: Ithaca Press, 2002),
60-61.
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have sustained the region was its location at one end of a trade route running overland
from Aden to Bahrain and on to Persia. Indeed, this trade route seems to have been so
prosperous that its presence led to something of a commercial peak of Central Arabia’s
al-Yamama region as the midpoint for this commerce.20 The goods South Arabia was
contributing to this commerce are not clear, one of the only specific products mentioned
being Yemeni swords.21 Certainly, South Arabia was one of the richest agricultural
regions of the peninsula, however, al-Yamama was at this time an exporter of produce, in
particular the wheat which cities such as Mecca depended upon22, thus it seems unlikely
that agricultural projects represented any significant contribution from al-Yemen. If the
goods sought in Persia from the region were then essentially specialized products, the
above mentioned swords and incense or other luxury goods long famous from the region,
this may add additional explanation as to why maritime trade was not a necessity, as
small scale luxury goods would not need the bulk transport which is one of the
advantages of shipping.
Notably missing from any list of commercial items are foreign goods passing
through the south. As noted earlier, Hourani attributed much of the trade between India
and the Mediterranean to Persian, rather than Arab seamanship and he goes so far as to
comment in particular on the lack of Arab sailing expertise in the Persian Gulf.23 While
this may initially seem rather anathema to the idea of Aden as a great port city, it becomes
more coherent if Persian consolidation of the trade routes across the peninsula reopened
land routes that had been previously abandoned. Indeed, what trade continued in the

20

Al-Askar, 53.
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
21
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west, on the Red Sea portion of the sea route, seems to have been taken up by Byzantine
activity as Persian dominance grew in the east.24 It is not an unlikely explanation that far
from active mariners, the Yemeni had earlier capitalized on their geographic position as a
stopping point for foreign seamen coming from both directions. If, as Hourani suggests,
Persians had dominated this eastern trade before, than as the land routes opened up due to
Sasanid annexation, the Yemeni would have continued to ply their own goods along these
terrestrial avenues while Persian sailors now went directly from India back up the Persian
Gulf. This theory is bolstered to some extent by a comment of al-Askar. “Nizar alHadithi asserts that in the Falaj market goods from al-Yemen were sold to by the
merchants of al-Yemen to merchants of al-Yamama who then sold these goods in Iraqi
markets. There is however, no explanation of why Yemeni merchants could not sell their
goods in Iraqi markets themselves.”25 The evidence would seem to suggest that the
Yemeni, in general, were not great travelers.
If there is little evidence for a strong Southern Arab merchant marine on the eve
of Islam, there is even less to suggest a strong naval military tradition. According to Ibn
Hisham, an eighth century editor of Muhammad’s biography, Persian rule in Southern
Arabia commenced when the Yemeni requested assistance from the Sasanid King in order
to overthrow their current rulers, an Ethiopian dynasty under the leadership of one
Masruq ibn Abraha. The Persians arrived in ships, and were met on land by Yemeni
support.26 While it may be of little surprise that the Yemeni would offer only earthbound

24

G. W. Bowersock, The Throne of Adulis: Red Sea Wars on the Eve of Islam (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013), 121.
25
al-Askar, 53.
26
Robert G. Hoyland, Arabia and the Arabs: From the Bronze Age to the Coming of Islam (London:
Routledge, 2001), 56-57.
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contingents to fight on what was, after all, their home soil, it is noteworthy that the
Persian forces arrived by sea. By the mid sixth century A.D., Persian dominance already
held sway in much of the southeastern peninsula, thus if land was a preferred route, little
should have stood in the way of an overland trek, yet the Sasanids chose a maritime
entrance. There are many arguments as to whether land or sea is a more advantageous
method for military action: Two points put forward in favor of the sea, which may be
relevant to this action, are the speed with which large forces may be moved (in this case,
it is claimed eight hundred men in eight ships)27 and the correlating lack of supplies that
need to be provided for the shorter travel period. While saying little about Yemeni naval
abilities, this story does support the notion that the Persians were familiar and
comfortable with sea travel and its many advantages.
More perhaps, can be learned from the earlier invasion of Southern Arabia by the
Ethiopian Axumites in 525 A.D. The full explanation for this invasion and the parties
involved is quite complex but the forces that finally arrived on Yemeni shores are said to
have done so in seventy ships which sailed from both East Africa and Aqaba at the
northern end of the Red Sea and arrived in an unidentified port.28 In response to the
invasion, the defending Arabs stretched a huge chain across the port’s entrance. The
chain, it seems, was not successful in stopping the Axumite force, however it was
certainly memorable, indeed, “prominent enough to leave enduring traces both in the
inscriptions of that time as well as in the later Arabic literary tradition.”29
The precise importance of these events is difficult to parse out and requires a great

27

Hoyland, 56-57.
Bowersock, The Throne of Adulis, 97.
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Ibid., 98.
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deal of reading between the lines. First, a force which apparently had access to an
overland route into Arabia, chose to invade by sea, suggesting some familiarity with the
advantages of naval warfare or at least transport. The most obvious source for an
effective maritime force in the Red Sea at this time would have been the Byzantines:
According to Procopius, the Byzantines actively supported the Axumite invasion of
Southern Arabia, both on religious grounds and with the hope of disrupting Persian
commercial interests.30 Yet the obvious nature of this assumption does not make it any
less problematic. The precise nature of Byzantine support is vague. The only specific
reference to Byzantine troops in the records indicate that they would have to have been
brought to East Africa for the expedition and thus were not presumably, naval.31
Moreover, it is far from clear that the Byzantines actually did so directly support the
action. The source material, both in inscriptions and later writings, seems to consider this
event a decidedly Axumite invasion. Indeed, the aftermath of the expedition resulted
primarily in a power struggle between Ethiopian Christians and local, Bedouin Sheikhs.
Finally, the need for Byzantine forces to disrupt Persian trade in the area via a proxy
invasion is difficult to understand if they maintained such maritime strength in the Red
Sea.32 Whatever the makeup of the invading armada, they did chose specifically to land
at a port (marsa),33 thus this was no mere expedient transportation of troops across the
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Bowersock. Empires in Collision in Late Antiquity, 24-25.
Bowersock, The Throne of Adulis, 97.
32
It must be noted however, that it is no less problematic to attribute this strong maritime endeavor to the
Axumites, who in their own right do not seem to have been historically noted as a strong naval power.
Indeed, the concept of ‘Persian Commercial Interests’ is rather vague: Because Byzantium sought to
disrupt them through naval action in the Red Sea, it is a natural assumption that they were both maritime in
nature and conducted along this body of water, but this is not necessarily the case. It is possible that these
interests were instead maintained through Sasanid control over land routes, both from India to Persia, and
through the Arabian Peninsula. In such a case, Byzantine sea action would have served to create
competition without direct, naval confrontation.
33
Bowersock, The Throne of Adulis, 98.
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Red Sea but instead a naval expedition that recognized the necessity of a naval target.
Finally, and most important, while the records of this event, whether hyperbolic or
not, mention such specific details as seventy ships and a huge chain, they make no
mention of any attempt on the part of the Southern Arabians to defend themselves at sea.
Indeed, the only maritime action noted was an attempt to close a port, a purely defensive
effort and one which, although it might suggest some awareness of defending from naval
entry, offers little in support of naval prowess. Indeed, the mere fact that this chain
carried such weight in local memory argues against it. The drawing of chains across
ports as a defensive measure is an ancient tactic in the Mediterranean (and other maritime
areas) and would therefore seem an unlikely event to maintain such historical
significance in the minds of a people well versed in naval actions.
Despite the difficulties of interpreting the exact nature of the events that occurred
in 525 A.D., certain conclusions do seem clear: First, there were sizeable naval resources
that could be drawn upon in the Red Sea. Second, there was some knowledge of naval
combat as a distinct form of action as opposed to mere naval transport of land troops.
Finally, although it is not clear who had control of these resources, of the four groups
having ongoing interests in the region, Ethiopian, Byzantine, Arab and Persian, the Arabs
are clearly the least likely candidate: The vessels were utilized by the Axumites, with the
support of the Byzantines. If the Persian commercial interests noted were maritime, there
was no military response to defend them and the Arab naval countermeasures were purely
defensive.
This lack of any reference to a skilled naval force seems consistent as one goes
back through the history of events in Southern Arabia. In the Classical period, Hourani
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determined that the Ptolemies were in complete charge of the Red Sea34 and added that
commercial shipping through it was protected against Arab pirates by the presence of a
Roman fleet,35 and supported by a recognized guild of Red Sea captains out of Palmyra.36
In his notations on the translation of the Periplus of the Erythraean Sea, Schoff
acknowledges Ptolemaic dominance however adds that prior to Rome’s expansion into
Egypt, the Southern Arabs had dominated this trade, Indian ships being refused entry
beyond the Bab al-Mandab.37 Here we are presented with somewhat of a conundrum:
On the one hand, this time period presents the best evidence of a strong, early Arab
maritime tradition. On the other, such a tradition seems to be depicted as quite primitive
by any standards.
The unknown writer of the Periplus notes that the Arab ships utilized on the Red
Sea (and beyond) were not made of nailed planks but were instead of two types: Either
they utilized stitched cord in place of nails or were merely large rafts floating on inflated
animal skins. Ships whose planks are held together with stitched cord were common not
only in the Red Sea, but also along the western coast of India.38 The value of such ships
is the subject of much debate, for while stitched construction provides for a very flexible
hull, it is also undeniably weaker than other types of plank construction, either nailed or
otherwise joined. Some authors thus favor utility as the predominant factor, claiming that
stitched construction is optimal in the areas where it has predominated while other
scholars consider the expense of iron nails to have been the deciding factor. The debate is
Hourani, 24.
Ibid., 34.
36
Ibid.
37
Wilfred H. Schoff, Trans. The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea: Travel and Trade In the Indian Ocean
By a Merchant Of the First Century (London: Longmans, Green, And Co., 1912), 89.
38
Himanshu Prabha Ray, The Archaeology of Seafaring In Ancient South Asia (Cambridge, United
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 59-61.
34
35
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not eased by the observation that up until modern times, both types of ship have
continued in use, side by side.39 Whatever the reasons for stitched construction, what is
clear is that ships built in this fashion seem to have offered few, if any advantages over
the Greco-Roman type vessels, at least in terms of long distance trade40 for with the
Ptolemaic entrance into the Red Sea, a new era of maritime trade was quickly established.
The first important change for al-Yemen was the replacement of Arab dominance
with that of Ptolemaic/Roman, as noted above by Hourani, a replacement which seems to
have taken place with little or no resistance on the part of the Southern Arabs. By the
time the Periplus was written, sometime around 60 A.D., it can be assumed that this
replacement was already well underway if not complete. The assumption seems fairly
safe as it was perhaps less than twenty years earlier that the second major change
occurred, the Greek discovery of the Monsoon Tradewinds. The regular pattern of these
winds allows for a direct route across the Indian Ocean, at least for ships strong enough
to withstand the rough seas created by them (i.e., not ships of stitched construction). This
discovery permitted direct trade between the Mediterranean and India, thus allowing the
Romans to circumvent either Arab or Persian middlemen and it was this discovery that, at
least in the view of some scholars, led to the blossoming of the sea trade through the Red
Sea.41 Perhaps importantly, the Periplus notes that at the time of its writing, a major port
on the Arabian Coast at the base of the Red Sea, was, “crowded with Arab shipowners
and seafaring men.”42 The deliberate reference of this statement is difficult to ascertain
with certainty however, it can be interpreted to suggest that the Arabs, at least at this time,
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were already acting as middlemen, owning ships and shipping interests but not
necessarily engaging in active travel themselves. There are also references throughout
the Periplus to Arab vessels and rafts which might have focused on local needs: Either as
longboats and loading vessels for cities which offered no convenient harbor, for very
short distance, coastal trade, such as between the Southern Arabs and the Nabataeans or
for internal use, such as bringing incense for distribution from government controlled
market centers. The author of the Periplus may thus be distinguishing between a sort of
small scale and protected local maritime commerce conducted by Arabs, and an
international maritime commerce conducted by foreigners, with Arab (Southern Arabian)
oversight. While these are certainly not inarguable deductions, they would comport well
with later trends as we have seen above, where the Yemeni appear to have been more
captains of commerce than journeymen per se.
The Periplus also mentions, again supported by Hourani, concerns of Arab piracy
along the Red Sea, noting that those, “sailing off the middle course are plundered, and
those surviving shipwrecks are taken for slaves.”43 This seems to suggest once more a
great limitation on the ability of Arab seamen as opposed to their Greco-Roman
counterparts. The Mediterranean takeover of shipping in the Red Sea, occurring as it
seems to have without serious contest, suggests that the Arab ships, effective though they
might have been in local conditions were not much of a match for the strong hulled Greek
craft. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that Arab piracy was depicted as a
coastal affair which could be avoided simply by following a more open sea route.
Indeed, as the coastal portions of the Red Sea are also noted as being generally dangerous
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due to their lack of harbors and proliferation of reefs, it may be that the greater danger
was natural, rather than anthropic. In short, at least from the entrance of Greek sailors
into the Red Sea, Southern Arabian maritime endeavors seem to have been easily and in a
sense, willingly outcompeted. The inhabitants of al-Yemen had only ever managed to
dominate trade on the Red Sea itself and with the advent of competition from the north,
they were content to withhold only a position as a stopover point, through which others
flowed. Furthermore, the Periplus also notes that Southern Arabia imported only a little
wheat, it being able to produce most of what it required, and exported myrrh, alabaster,
ivory and tortoise shell.44 This export of luxury goods, as noted above, belies the need
for shipping as an effective way to transport bulk items. Strong ships and an effective
navy would have been unnecessary to make certain that such products made it to
commercial ports, overland routes being available even if not preferred, and as long as
trade continued to flow through South Arabia, it is understandable that the origin of the
sailors transporting it would have been relatively unimportant to the Yemeni themselves.
Moreover, there is the question of cost. Mediterranean interests in the area seem to have
been limited to promoting and protecting trade45. Small scale and coastal trade appears to
have continued and perhaps prospered under Greco-Roman protection, and if these
foreign powers were willing to supply it, there would have been little reason for the
Yemeni to put the effort into developing their own naval forces.
In summary, the centuries leading up to the rise of Islam offer little evidence to
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suggest that the Southern Arabs were great or even willing mariners. The strongest
evidence in support of this conclusion is probably the failure of the rapidly expanding
Muslim armies to utilize any native talent on the Mediterranean. In most other military
areas, during this initial expansion, Arab might was not only tried, but preferred, yet on
the sea it was considered better to pay conquered foreigners to man the ships, even if the
Arabs themselves would man the weapons required for victory. This lack of nautical
military prowess is underscored by Yemeni failure to defend in kind against either
commercial maritime competition, or repeated invasions by sea, instead offering only the
most dismal of maritime defensive moves.
Instead, while the Southern Arabs seemed to have been willing to engage in
maritime commerce, this willingness seems to have been a pragmatic stopgap rather than
an ingrained tradition. The natural products of al-Yemen did not necessitate a strong
merchant marine: On the one hand, the land was fertile enough to provide most if not all
of its agricultural requirements. On the other, its valuable and internationally sought after
exports were small scale luxury items that could be transported as easily over land as by
sea. Moreover, as a trading center, the region could thrive without its citizens undergoing
the inherent dangers of travel required to move goods from one market to another.
Situated between large capacity markets in India, the Mediterranean or Persia, trade
would flow through the region regardless of who manned the helm. Moreover, without
the need of a strong maritime commercial fleet, it is hardly surprising that a military one
failed to develop as, for the most part Southern Arabia’s battles could, and would, be
fought on land. Where local need required, small but effective Arab vessels were
available, but beyond this, foreign participants were willing to shoulder the risk, and
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defense, of the nautical trade networks. On balance indeed, it seems almost absurd to
fling oneself into the questionable forces of the sea when others where consistently
willing to do so instead.
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Happy Arabia:
Southern Arabia at Its Apex
The fact that in the centuries prior to the blossoming of Islam, little evidence can
be found for a native, Southern Arabian maritime tradition does not mean that such a
tradition never existed. Indeed, as noted above, prior to the arrival of the Greek
Ptolemies, the inhabitants of Southern Arabia seem to have been the dominant sailors on
the Red Sea and likely participants beyond. If their own autochthonous nautical efforts
were eventually overshadowed, this would not be surprising given the circumstances
noted and it would certainly not erase earlier achievements. Moreover, as has been
discussed in the centuries already reviewed, Southern Arabia was in somewhat of a
decline: Although it remained a relatively prosperous region, it was also increasingly
embroiled in the struggles of the Persian and Mediterranean powers whose political and
economic might were far greater. As such, many of its underlying native foundations
may be viewed only imperfectly through the lens of foreign interests and observers. In
contrast, this section examines Southern Arabia from the first stirrings of its homegrown,
imperial ambitions in the tenth century B.C., until their eventual decline before the
expanding influence of Ptolemaic Egypt. Because the history of the kingdoms that arose
during this period is relatively unknown, a more lengthy summary is perhaps justified
than might otherwise be necessary.
Starting in the tenth century, B.C., the history of South Arabia is on fairly firm
ground, for it is at this point that the region’s first, well defined, independent kingdoms
arise. Whereas the vast majority of our references to the region in the previous section
22

are gleaned from foreign sources, much of our knowledge of these powers comes from
monuments that they themselves raised, inscribed using their own languages and
numbering close to ten thousand.46 Unfortunately, whereas the later sources are
complicated by often rather vague references to powers in the area, these South Arabian
inscriptions offer an opposite, though no less perplexing problem, “they almost never
allude to events outside South Arabia.”47 This has led to furious arguments in the
scholarly community regarding the formation of some kind of chronology for the area
and thus, though we can to some extent trace the rise and fall of these powers, specific
dates remain extremely problematic.
Regardless of the finer points of chronology, the earliest known kingdom to
establish itself in Southern Arabia was that of Saba, a power that long ago entered the
popular western imagination as the home of the legendary Queen of Sheba. Whether or
not a contemporary of Solomon ruled there, the kingdom of Saba had its origins in the
immediate environs of Marib and its oasis.48 The earliest reference to the Sabaeans comes
from an Assyrian document which notes that a caravan from Teima and Saba was raided
near the city of Ḫindanu, near present day Abu Kemal, an event that probably took place
between 1075 and 890, B.C.49 These dates are drawn in part from the fact that within
their span, Ḫindanu paid tribute to Assyria in goods which included myrrh and alabaster,
and thus would have needed to import this rare commodity from South Arabia, in this
case, Saba, and for our purposes, contain several important implications. First, it is
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interesting that from the very earliest mention of a specific South Arabian entity, luxury
goods, and in particular incense, is also attested, an association that, as we have seen,
would carry on for at least the next millennium and a half. Second, it also demonstrates,
at an early date, the mercantile nature of South Arabia, for the caravan is mentioned as
one of Saba, rather than merely one that carried myrrh. Even if Saba was at this point far
removed from its later royal aspirations, the people must have been sufficiently well
known in Assyria to garner specific mention. Additionally, the fact that Saba was not
only trading with, but was well enough known to be mentioned in Assyria possibly lends
support to the idea that South Arabia may have been connected within the Mesopotamian
trade web. This final point is lent additional weight, as some scholars have posited due to
linguistic similarities, that the Sabaeans may have migrated to South Arabia from an
original homeland in Eastern or Central Arabia.50 While all of these points lend credence
to the idea of an early South Arabian presence with the trading networks of
Mesopotamia, they do not support the idea of a people vested in maritime power, and in
fact would seem to suggest the opposite. While the sea as a means of travel has often
been cited for its relative speed and ease, the early Sabaeans apparently chose to travel by
caravan, a decision which perhaps has bearing on their later comfort with land rather than
sea routes over which to engage in commerce.
The lack of maritime influence only becomes more emphatic as Saba grows into a
significant power. Whatever their position amongst the various peoples of the peninsula
during the time of the caravan raid, they soon became a centralizing force in the region.
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It has been conjectured that the mountainous valleys of South Arabia inherently
fragmented power in the region and instead encouraged the formation of small
communities, communities that would have been bound together through some type of
cult activity.51 In support of this theory, it would seem that the name Saba never
designated a particularly large area, but rather, a people in the Wadi Dhana centered
around their capital Ma’rib, who exerted influence over additional tribes, either as direct
dependents or as vassal states that were offered protection in return for tribute.52 Indeed,
the leader of Saba was designated mukarrib, which would translate to something along
the lines of ‘federator’ and many inscriptions refer to Saba and the Union, a union which
was celebrated in formal ceremonies and to which monuments were raised inscribing
various members beginning in the seventh century, B.C. 53
Of course, entry into the union was not always peaceful and it seems that, at least
in the beginning, Saba required military persuasion, which came early on in the form of
one particular leader, Karib’il Watar. Karib’il Watar claimed to have won eight victories
and to have spread the power of Saba to all the edges of the desert by the end of his reign.
Of particular relevance to this work were his first two targets, the Kingdom of Awsan
centered in the fertile, Markha Valley to the southeast of Ma’rib, and that of Nashshan, to
the northwest, depending on the agricultural products of Wadi Madhab and Wadi Kharid.
These goals provide a clear outline of what motivated Saba’s expansion: Awsan
controlled not only rich, agricultural resources, but incense producing territories as well.
Moreover, the Markha Valley sculpted the northeast-southwest caravan route from this
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wealthy region, into Saba. Nashshan likewise, was situated over a major caravan route,
this one connecting Saba to the north, and of course beyond, to the great markets of
Persia and the Mediterranean. After victories over both of these kingdoms, Karib’il
Watar would go on to conquer more coastal areas, and possibly, to invade Eritrea, where
Sabaean inscriptions from this period have been found54, but from its first push toward
regional hegemony, we see that Saba was primarily interested in control of agricultural
lands, and caravan routes.
The demonstrable success of this early consolidation, quickly mitigated by the
fractured geography of the region, produced rivals which sought to emulate Saba’s
success. While the exact relationships are somewhat unclear, the powers of Ma’in,
Qataban and Hadramawt soon developed as vassals, allies, rivals and eventually
independent kingdoms in their own right.

During the period which stretched from

around 400 B.C. to around 125 B.C., these four kingdoms existed in a state of some
balance, and this stretch of time may in many ways be seen as the acme of South Arabian
autonomous growth. Regardless of which kingdom may have been in ascendancy or
decline at any given period, the pattern set by Karib’il Watar seems to have always
dominated. Control was gleaned from terrestrial caravan routes and agricultural
potential, usually realized through the maintenance of complex hydrological projects.
On the one hand, it is during this period that South Arabian influence in maritime
matters must have been at its height. An inscription in the Ma’in language exists on the
Greek island of Delos, attesting to the wide spread travel of the kingdom’s merchants.55
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Additionally, inscriptions from South Arabia note the consistent import of foreign wives
into the Kingdoms, suggesting a cosmopolitan engagement with the Mediterranean and
Persian powers. Finally, it was during this period that Greek influence was only
beginning to infiltrate the Red Sea and thus this must be the epoch when Arab seafaring
was either at its apex or still maintained some degree of balanced competition with the
Hellenes.
On the other hand, many scholars of the area have considered this, “the period of
“royal caravan leaders,”56 where the four kingdoms essentially vied with each other over
the overland incense trade routes. It may be the case then that Mediterranean trade was
largely ancillary to what the South Arabians considered their primary means of wealth,
trade with Persia, (at this time the Parthians). Later evidence supports this supposition:
A drop in the Kingdom of Ma’in’s fortunes has been traced to their loss of control over
the overland incense trade routes and a subsequent turn to maritime trade.57 One of the
reasons Rome was finally moved to attack South Arabia itself (c. 35 B.C.) was in order to
secure direct trade of incense and silk via the sea, as the land route coming from the East
was subject to numerous difficulties. Moreover, the South Arabians at this time had
already begun to strengthen their ties with Persia, ties that would seem to have continued
until the advent of Islam, and thus the Romans were anxious to gain an independent hold
on a trade route which could be protected from their ancient rivals.
Perhaps most important of all, archaeological evidence from this period does little
to promote the idea of a maritime peoples, instead illuminating a group that appear
fundamentally terrestrial. Essentially, the power and independence of Southern Arabia
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was built upon the complex and intricate workings of their irrigation systems, built with
hydrological expertise evidenced as far back as the late third millennium B.C.58 These
systems allowed water to flow over crops in the long desert months and for the violent
rains of the monsoon to be curtailed in the rainy season. Crops and agriculture provided
for a larger population and this larger population in turn provided for the growth and
power of the region, especially when compared to the sparse resources of the rest of the
Peninsula. This recognition that land and agriculture was nearly synonymous with power
is evident in almost every aspect of Southern Arabian life. The religion acknowledged
several gods but the chief amongst these reigned over irrigation and the harvest.59 Indeed
beyond these larger themes, only gods of mountains, borders and oaths have been
identified although there did exist a panoply of tutelary deities honored by particular
communities or cities. All of these deities were supported by temples that controlled
considerable wealth garnered by control of extensive tracts of land.60
Beyond religious considerations, simple identity was tied to the land itself.
Southern Arabian society was divided into three tiers of identity, correlating with tribal
affiliation, clan membership, and subclan identification, a system which not only appears
to have been remarkably stable from the most ancient times, but to a large degree
continues to the present day.61 “Each tribe took its name from the territory in which it
was located,”62 and thus identity at the most fundamental tier, was intrinsically tied to the
land. This is not to suggest that individuals could not move within this system, or even
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travel extensively, and still maintain a place within such a structure, but it certainly did
not encourage the rise of a social group whose identity would have been more defined by
roving upon the waves than owning fields. Indeed, even identifying with a city or urban
center allows for a potentially greater degree of movement. One can, and often does
move from place to place within urban boundaries, but it was not cities with which
Southern Arabs found self-identification, for to take a single example, “A Minaean took
his identity from his clan and tribe, but the city was not named for any one clan.”63
The rural repercussions of this social structure are seemingly echoed throughout
Southern Arabian culture. Wealth and status of the secular elite seem to have been
irrevocably tied to farming and land ownership, with the nobility engaging in warfare and
agriculture, and often specifically disdaining to enter into commerce64. Even the
architecture of the region reflects this concern, for the tower house, still famous in
modern day Yemen, was the dominant structure in its ancestral lands as well. Such
vertical architecture predominated not only in cities, but in the countryside as well, where
it is recognized as ensuring, “adequate surveillance of orchards and vineyards.”65
Even if the lower end of the social ladder was not able to own land or practice
agriculture as the elites did, it would appear that such things were never far from their
minds. Peasants appear to have lived predominantly in the fields, rather than in poor,
urban areas, where their homes mimicked the tower houses of the elites on a lesser scale.
Moreover, “a number of edicts promulgated between the fourth and second centuries B.C.
suggest that the fund of communally owned property gradually diminished while that of
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individual landowners increased.”66 The large tracts of land owned by elites seem to
have remained relatively stable, thus this, along with the fact that in even the smallest
villages, one or two larger homes would arise amongst the smaller kind, would suggest
that peasants were able to move up in society. When they did so however, they emulated
the nobility and any wealth accumulated through the ‘lesser’ trades of commerce or
artistry was invested in land. Moreover, besides the grand inscriptions of cities and
rulers, there appear numerous, so called, peasant inscriptions, which are almost
exclusively devoted to agricultural concerns.67
In summary then, the kingdoms of Southern Arabia arose over control of two
major resources: Agricultural lands and caravan routes. The state existed primarily to
defend these commodities, most often from local rivals, whose presence was nearly
assured by the fractured nature of the geographical landscape, and thus there was little
wealth, or inclination, to invest in maritime commerce. Moreover, this focus on land and
crop production as the basis of wealth was reiterated in every facet of Yemeni society.
Identity itself was a reference to land, as was religious conviction, wealth and prestige.
Some degree of maritime exploitation must have existed, but this was a means of
subsistence, adequate only to gain the resources to move beyond it and enter into ‘polite’
society. Even if the occasional individual might have looked to the sea for fortune, it
seems unlikely that they did so for a future. Given these circumstances, it is a fair
assumption that no culturally supported maritime tradition had fertile ground in which to
grow.
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Up From the Sands of Time
There still exists however, the possibility that maritime activity played a greater
role in the life of Southern Arabs, prior to the rise of independent states in the region.
The history of Mesopotamia is, at least for the Western World, synonymous with the
history of civilization. Not surprisingly, the earliest written records also record the
earliest references to maritime power and while Mesopotamia itself may have been
primarily concerned with terrestrial matters, or at the most riparian concerns, it is clear
that they recognized the importance of the sea for trade and travel, especially when
dealing with foreign powers. Indeed some of these records even seem to refer to a dialect
or occupational jargon known as “eme-ma2-laḫ4” or ‘language of sailors’, although thus
far, scholars have found no written examples of the language68. It would seem more
likely than not then, that Southern Arabia, so close to the region, would have been
encompassed in this early sea faring community and that a maritime tradition arose
amongst its peoples that perhaps persisted, though later pushed to the margins of society.
Amongst the most ancient of the foreign powers mentioned in the extant texts are
Dilmun, Magan and Meluḫḫa. Precise identification of these lands remains difficult,
especially as there is good evidence that the names might have been used to designate
widely divergent areas over time.69 Dilmun, for example, is thought to have eventually
come to represent Bahrain however, archaeological finds argue in favor of the theory that
originally, Dilmun referred to a portion of the eastern Arabian Peninsula west of modern
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Bahrain.70 In these early times, Dilmun was a trading partner of the highest import to
Mesopotamia, supplying a variety of vital natural resources including much needed
copper, building stone and timber. Of special importance is that ships from Dilmun are
also specifically referenced as importing timber from foreign lands, i.e. not from Dilmun
itself.71 Such texts, dated to around 2500 BC, imply that at least by this time, there was
some kind of international shipping network in place, a network which would appear to
have included middle men, i.e. the Dilmunites, of some kind. The importation of timber
into the arid Near East has remained crucial until quite modern times, with Arab dhows
bringing wood from both East Africa and India.
Unfortunately, there is nothing in the texts to suggest where the ships of Dilmun
were bringing timber from however, several factors might suggest that they were utilizing
the same resources as their later counterparts, and thus, in heading west toward East
Africa, would have been in contact with Southern Arabia. First, India and Africa are the
most logical sources of timber of sufficient size and strength to make effective building
materials.72 Second, accepting the presence of some type of shipping network, it seems
unlikely that Dilmun ships would have only traveled to the east, as even coastal sailing
would have allowed them to explore in both directions. Third, limited trade goods from
Southern Arabia have been identified in Mesopotamia, notably ochre and diorite,
suggesting some trade was occurring with the region although whether it arrived by land
or ship is as yet, impossible to tell.73 And finally, general consensus considers the
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kingdom of Meluḫḫa to have been located in the Indus Valley. Clearly, Meluḫḫa traded
with Mesopotamia, as there is even evidence of Meluḫḫa colonies existing within the
region.74 It seems unlikely then, that ‘ships of Dilmun’ would have been required to
facilitate this trade. It is not, of course, inconceivable that Dilmun shipping retained a
monopoly over maritime transport for some time, but even if that were the case, one
might expect the products of this trade to be identified as coming from Meluḫḫa, rather
than merely from, ‘foreign lands’. In short, even at the early date of 2500 BC, it seems
likely that Southern Arabia was part of a vast shipping network. The evidence does not
support the idea of Southern Arabian shipping, but logic would suggest that they may
have at least played a role similar to that they would hold in the Classical Period, as a
stopover point between east and west.
Later texts offer support for the continued existence of this maritime trade system,
even as the players change. Indeed, it would seem that the early emphasis on Dilmun
merely gave way to a more international situation, where, “ships from Dilmun, Magan,
and Meluḫḫa docked at the quay of Agade.”75 Moreover, there is textual material
supporting the idea that at this point, if not before, the value of naval transport for warfare
was well established. The relevant text involves some type of conflict between Akkad
and Magan. Like Dilmun, the exact location of Magan continues to be a source of debate
however, it is generally held to have been in modern day Oman. The text claims that an
Akkadian leader, Maniŝtuŝu, “had ships built to cross the Lower Sea, where a force
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drawn from thirty-two cities had assembled to do battle.”76 Beyond its early reference to
naval concerns, the text suggests two additional, important facts. First, Maniŝtuŝu travels
across the Lower Sea after claiming victories in modern day Iran. The fact that he had
ships built for this purpose, rather than simply marching back into Mesopotamia and
down into Magan suggests clear recognition of the speed which sea travel could offer
when necessary. Second, clearly, a force drawn from thirty-two cities suggests a
substantial number of troops and the fact that Maniŝtuŝu was victorious suggests that he
had required the transport of a significant force himself.77
It is difficult to doubt then, that a world of maritime endeavor was swirling
around al-Yemen, one in which the sea was recognized for the advantages it offered to
both military and commercial activity. But how fully tuned in was Southern Arabia to
the larger events of the age? Inquiry into this subject has yielded only the most
ambiguous of answers. Archaeological work suggests that the oldest clear sign of human
habitation yet discovered on Arabian soil lies within South Arabia, a site known as Jabal
Tala, where Achuelean hand-axes have been discovered dating back more than three
hundred millennia.78 Despite such an impressive pedigree however, archaeological
interest in South Arabia has not fared as well as in other areas of the peninsula, leaving
large gaps in the record which are only slowly being filled in. While much work remains,
enough has been done to satisfy most scholars that South Arabia’s importance dates far
back into the earliest reaches of humankind, especially as a link between Asia and Africa,
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and that it has been continuously inhabited from the earliest times.79 Fortunately, other
areas of the Arabian Peninsula have fared better, and excavations in these areas show that
the earliest inhabitants were fully exploiting all the resources that the sea had to offer,
including fish, shellfish and sea mammals. Some sites, such as Al-Markh in Bahrain,
show that, “virtually all bones recovered were those of fish.”80 Bahrain is admittedly far
from the South Arabia forming the focus of this paper however, the fact that such
exploitation was taking place, coupled with the determination that habitation in the South
has been both ancient and continuous argues in favor of the fact that South Arabs were
utilizing the sea for its resources from a very early date. Again, this does not imply
maritime activity per se, but it is likely that in conjunction with simple fishing and sea
mammal hunting, that at least small craft were being used to ply the waters of the Red
Sea and Indian Ocean.
As noted above however, the archaeological record of South Arabia is not well
developed. A number of factors have contributed to this unfortunate gap, including
limited and relatively late access by the Western European archaeologists that would
uncover cities such Ur and Uruk, later marginalization of South Arabia under the Islamic
powers of the Middle East and social unrest lasting up through modern times. More
damaging however than these factors combined, is Southern Arabia’s geographical
location, just slightly too far from the great Mesopotamian centers of civilization to share
in the great discoveries that first rocketed archaeology into the academic limelight.
Sadly, this situation is one that has been exacerbated by modern scholarship, rather than
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alleviated by it, for while the Arabian Peninsula has been linked more and more closely
with the ancient civilizations of the Fertile Crescent, political stability as well as
proximity has favored archaeological exploration of Eastern Arabia. This exploration has
yielded various finds, some quite impressive, but rather than increasing the scope of
excavation, these finds have thus far merely led to a heavy emphasis on the eastern
portion of the Peninsula in scholarly writings. This emphasis however, should be taken
in context, for if Southern Arabia has not been the recipient of the same extensive studies
as its neighbors, its importance to ancient Mesopotamia may still lie beneath the sands.
Such a claim might appear spurious however, early scholars, unfettered by an unequal
trove of archaeological evidence, certainly suggested a greater role for Southern Arabia
than is now generally recognized. Many such conclusions were fueled by the plethora of
ambiguous and enigmatic texts whose discovery represented part of the great treasure
caches from cities like Ur and Lagash. Part of the problem is that, while our ability to
translate these documents continues to grow, even now, “Knowledge of Sumerian is still
in a rudimentary, experimental stage where scholars differ on essential points, so that
translations, even by highly competent scholars, may diverge so much that one would
never guess that they rendered the same text,”81 and indeed, that “there are as many
Sumerian languages as there are Sumerologists”.82
Incomplete though our understanding may be, hints in these documents led to
early claims that Southern Arabia may have figured as a maritime power in its own right,
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even in this ancient period. Mesopotamian texts refer, at various points, to a kingdom
known simply as the Sealand. Within vague texts, the Sealand itself stands out for its
ambiguity and little is known about it except for a few king lists and some possible
references to conflicts with Mesopotamia. Initially, it was thought that the Sealand was
simply a reference to some area in Southern Mesopotamia, near the mouth of the rivers,
where reeds and marshes predominate, and indeed was perhaps some nickname for Uruk
itself.83 As more texts came to light however, the Sealand seemed to suggest both a far
more distant, and significant power, one which Sargon of Akkad had struggled to
conquer and whose kings had reigned for centuries.84 Examination of these conflicts led
some early scholars to posit a significant role for the nation, noting that its mention,
though rare, implies a substantial power which seems to have lasted for several centuries.
Unfortunately, this early hypothesis, that the Sealand, a mighty rival of the
greatest Mesopotamian city states, might denote Southern Arabia, remains the strongest
claim to a maritime culture in the region. To date, there has been no discovery of large,
urban ruins in the Yemen dating to this period. Furthermore, as more sites have been
discovered elsewhere, the link between the historical analysis of Mesopotamia’s ancient
records and archaeological analysis of extent remains, has grown more tenuous. Without
a site to connect definitively to the ancient references, the Sealand is largely ignored in
current scholarship. To be clear, location of the Sealand has not been proven outside of
Southern Arabia, but speculation has nearly ceased as other sites, such as Dilmun have
been discovered and thus offer more immediately, scholarly gratification.
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Flotsam
If we retrace the growth of civilization in Southern Arabia, from small groups
living on the borderlands of the great Mesopotamian civilizations, gradually flowering
into strong and independent kingdoms and finally being absorbed into the more powerful
interests of Rome, Persia and eventually, a coherent Islamic identity, one certainly sees
the development and flowering of a great and unique culture. But there is little to suggest
that it was a culture that saw its fortunes or its future on the sea. Certain facts present
themselves: Without question, the earliest inhabitants of the area utilized maritime
resources for sustenance, and those individuals who actually lived along the coastline no
doubt continued to do so, as their modern counterparts do to the present day.
Although there is still some open question on the precise location of the Sealand,
current thinking and the extant archaeological evidence does not support the occurrence
of a great urban civilization in the southern Arabian Peninsula at this time. This does not
imply isolation however. Considering the tremendous reach of the early Mesopotamian
trading networks the Yemen must have been integrated into them. The international
nature of these networks, and the resources which flowed along them certainly involved
passing along the Peninsula and given the preference for coastal sailing which, to some
extent, remains to this day, it is a safe assumption that the Southern Arabs, or their
predecessors, would have been consistently visited by Mesopotamian ships on their way
past. Again, there is nothing to suggest that the inhabitants of the Peninsula were
engaging in this trade as active mariners, but it is here that their future position as
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middlemen must have begun to form as their geographical position would have offered a
great deal to ships making the long passage from East Africa to the wealthy and resource
hungry city states of Mesopotamia.
As the political situation in these city states began to change, and more powerful
players arose to challenge them, either a group of early Arabs moved into the southern
portion of the Peninsula from the east, or the groups already living there began to
consolidate their power and develop more enduring methods of cultural expression. In
either case, the relationship between this earliest Yemen and the Mesopotamian basin
was fostered by the land routes which connected them across the intervening deserts and
mountains and least a certain portion of this relationship was based on high end, luxury
resources, such as incense, which no longer merely flowed past the region, but where
garnered from it.
From this point on, South Arabia continued to develop as an independent region
in its own right, with its growth centering on two foundations. The first of these was
agriculture, which when combined with hydrological and engineering expertise, could
support a large population, a unique circumstance in the forbidding environment of the
Peninsula. Given the organization needed for the development and maintenance of these
agricultural works, the rise of states within the region was perhaps inevitable, but
unquestionably fast. In these early states political power, and social status, was defined
by control over agriculture but was eventually transformed into military power, used to
control the second foundation of growth in the region, the aforementioned land routes,
which quickly expanded to encompass the Eastern Mediterranean regions as well as the
Mesopotamian heartlands. The geographical nature of the region supported the rise of
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kingdoms in one particular valley or another, and the balance of power often shifted, but
in each case the path taken by a new or renewed state was remarkably similar: Control of
agriculture led to control of the population, which led to military power, which allowed
for control over trade routes.
This sketch not only explains the rise and flourishing of the independent
kingdoms of South Arabia, but comports well with the archaeological and historical
evidence from the region. Civilizations rose in which control over agriculture was the
paramount expression of power, religions centered on agricultural deities and even the
preferred architectural forms suggest a fundamental and preeminent concern over land
and crops. Military exploits almost universally record the conquest and control of
terrestrial trade routes and the prominence of one kingdom or another seems clearly tied
to this exercise of power. Clearly, individuals engaged in maritime endeavors during this
time, but these seem to have been the prerogative of just that, individuals, who either by
choice or necessity chose to seek their fortunes in a way not exemplified by their larger
societies.
Of course, as the civilizations in Southern Arabia continued to grow, so too did
those around them and as the region became more integrated into the larger Classical
world, their independence was matched against the economic and military might of
Persia, Rome and Ethiopia. Initially, this led to additional wealth for the region, as
Mediterranean sailors utilized the region as a stopover point in their own trade networks,
emulating the actions of their ancient, Mesopotamian counterparts. This development did
not fundamentally alter the workings of the Yemen. The new source of trade did not cut
off the land routes, nor did it alter the agricultural needs of the population base, it simply
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added, by the effort of others, to the wealth that flowed through the region. Trade was
brought to region, rather than developed by it.
Under the continued growth of these foreign empires, the region became
increasingly embroiled in their border politics and as a result, its ability for truly
independent action became shakier and shakier. Some degree of foreign dominance was
accepted, as in the de facto Roman takeover of the Red Sea; but other aspects, such as
outright political control, were resisted, and when local forces were insufficient for
effective resistance, the region turned east, toward Persia, and the Mesopotamian basin,
for protection. Persia welcomed this control over the region, for it allowed her to expand
her borders against the interests of Rome, increase control over the economic resources of
the region and stop the flow of commerce to her rival. The region was sufficiently
developed to be integrated into an urbanized Persian society on a level somewhat beyond
that of a mere border state or foreign territory and thus the Yemen that was consolidated
into the expanding Islamic world, was one which was already strongly tied to the eastern
Empire.
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Jetsam
The summary offered above is essentially factual. As such, it comports well with
the various threads of evidence available from the region, but does little to answer the
questions posed by this paper. Offered here are some possible interpretations of those
facts. As interpretations, they are, of course, far more liable to argument and counter
evidence but what they lack in objective rigor, they make up for in debatable inquiry,
which after all, informs the more seductive side of history. The first of these conclusions
is that a strong maritime outlook cannot be considered part of Southern Arabia’s
foundation, because the region as an independent cultural milieu was based on
fundamentally terrestrial concerns. The second conclusion is that no strong maritime
tradition arose in Southern Arabia, even as it reached its apex of cultural development,
because it was unnecessary for wealth, prestige or even trade. Finally, I conclude that
Southern Arabs were not called upon to bolster the maritime aspirations of the new
Islamic identity, because despite tantalizing suggestions to the contrary, they did not
exist, at least not in a way which was recognizable to the Arab/Muslim identity then
developing.
The first conclusion involves the question of whether or not Southern Arabia is a
likely place for a heavily maritime oriented culture to arise. As noted early on, at first
glance, Southern Arabia looks as though it should be ripe for such development. It is
surrounded by rich and navigable waters, its position between large and powerful empires
would appear conducive to the development of trade and exploration, and its wealth
would seem to invite jealousy and invasion, necessitating a strong naval defense.
Moreover, in general outline, the rise of the earliest, complex and urban civilizations in
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the Mesopotamian cradle seems to have been dependent on the development of sufficient
resources to support a large population. A sufficient population allowed for
specialization and the development of an elite which demanded resources beyond those
required for subsistence, thus leading to extensive trade networks and the accumulation
of wealth on a hitherto unheard of scale. Southern Arabia seems to follow this trend and
as the development of trade networks in Mesopotamia both encouraged, and were
encouraged by, progressively improving nautical skill, why should the same not hold for
the Yemen?
The answer, beyond first glance, is that Southern Arabia took a fundamentally
different path of development than that of other regions, even those nearby. First of all,
no concrete evidence shows the rise of a large, urban civilization in the vicinity,
contemporaneous with that which occurred in Mesopotamia. This may be explained at
least in part, by the fact that the agricultural capability of the region is not nearly as
straightforward as it first appears, for although the area has both the soil and water
necessary to produce an ample crop, especially in contrast to the rest of the Arabian
Peninsula, the nature of its topography requires that water from the monsoon rains be
carefully controlled. It must first be curtailed to prevent massive flooding and violent
runoff, and then saved to nurture growing crops in the arid months following deluge.
Agriculture could thus develop in the region, and eventually flourish, but this required the
time for specialized engineering expertise to arise in the Yemen, and in the meantime,
large and powerful states were arising to the east which would have a significant impact
on the region’s future.
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As these states grew, they demanded more and more resources, including luxury
goods from farther and farther away. The trade networks they developed to secure these
goods certainly encompassed Southern Arabia, but did not focus on it, again most
probably through accidents of geography. The great city states that arose at this time
seem to have had two types of trading partners, similarly large and complex civilizations
in other areas, from which goods were both imported and exported, and regions from
which they could procure vital natural resources. As noted above, the population of the
Yemen at this time could not sustain a substantial, autochthonous state and the region as a
whole was not granted the type of resources which justified a significant, independent,
colonization effort. Timber was worth such an effort to procure, but the superior types
for building did not occur in Southern Arabia. Such timber did however, occur to the
west, in Africa, thus ships from Mesopotamia would pass by the region and probably stop
off for supplies and some incidental trading. At this early date then, trade, and
specifically maritime trade, became something that traveled to the region, by the efforts
of foreign merchants. As a resource to be exploited, incoming commercial vessels might
be likened to any other migratory entity, or even the monsoon rain itself.
Of course, the potential existed for the Southern Arabs to enter into this trade as
more active participants, but they did not, because the effort involved was not necessary.
The region did become more heavily integrated into the sphere of Mesopotamian
economic activity, but this integration came from the development of caravan routes on
the landward side, which like the marine paths, were most likely established by foreign
interests. The needs and economic power of the Southern Arabs themselves would have
still been quite small at this time, but in the invaluable incense unique to the region, the
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Mesopotamians recognized a resource which could not be garnered elsewhere. The
precise impact of this integration is difficult to determine, but it is not an unlikely
scenario that as the use, and value, of incense increased in the east, greater local emphasis
was put on its exploitation, leading to organized efforts which could not only establish
and maintain caravan routes but also develop the highly specialized hydro-engineering
expertise for greater agriculture. Whether this expertise was developed locally or
imported into the region through increasing contact with more experienced neighbors
hardly matters: What is important is that the demand for this trade, and thus the impetus
and technology for substantial population growth in the region, both came over land.
Of course, during this development, some exposure to maritime trade would have
continued, as would exploitation of the sea’s resources on the local level, but the future
for growth and consolidation on a grand scale was seen in controlling a terrestrial
resource which commanded the attention, and wealth, of the eastern city states. As noted
previously, the transport of incense, a small and light commodity, was not significantly
eased by water travel and in any case, a swing in power had occurred in the east, whereby
more northern and landlocked cities were at the apex of influence. The organization and
consolidation that would lead to the significant growth in the area, thus came from the
land, and with it, the ability to support a higher population. Ironically then, for an area
surrounded by such rich maritime potential, progress toward independent nationhood was
inspired by a purely telluric resource.
The next phase of development in the region, which saw the rise of the small, but
independent kingdoms, such as Ma’in and Qataban, again seems a promising platform
upon which a strong maritime tradition might be built. But once more, this does not seem
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to have occurred. While the inspiration for increasing organization and consolidation
was probably the desire for the riches offered by trade with Mesopotamia, the ultimate
mechanism that provided for this was agriculture-agriculture made possible by the great
hydrological works still famous in the region. The development of significant production
in the fertile valleys of the region led to larger populations, and these populations, once
united, could be enlisted to dominate a trade route and/or incense producing region. Had
a single state arisen and expanded in the region, it might have, given time, diversified and
a significant portion of its population dedicated themselves to the sea, but this is not what
came to pass. Instead, various states arose, the fractured nature of the landscape
sheltering a relatively large potential number of population ‘centers’. As fortunes turned,
any one of these states might gain dominance for a time but they were each closely
enough related on the fundamental cultural level that this dominance was always sought
and maintained in the same way: gaining control of agricultural potential, population and
finally, the caravan routes. Each state, or potential state, was essentially a player in one
game, and thus shared the same goal. No state reigned supreme for long enough to
diversify significantly into the maritime realm, and no state arose in far enough isolation
to exist outside of this particular brand of competition.
In addition, this fierce competition probably also stifled a rise in maritime
endeavor in another way. Individuals living in the small, coastal communities, could
build the vessels necessary for fishing along the immediate shoreline and perhaps even
for minor transport, but the construction of large ships would have required either a
united, communal effort, or government assistance. Generally speaking, in Southern
Arabia, the state was responsible primarily for maintaining the hydrological works within
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its borders, and in a secondary capacity, for providing protection for merchants along the
caravan routes. Had a single state ever gained absolute dominance, it might have
garnered a sufficient surplus to invest in building larger vessels (the wealth was certainly
there) but as competitors were always one valley away, the resources of the state where
already otherwise allocated.
On the micro-level, because the states saw the potential for power in terms of
these twin resources of agriculture and caravan routes, the same goals prevailed amongst
the majority of individuals. As we have seen, cultural expressions of success and prestige
were almost exclusively dedicated to land ownership and the wealth this ownership
brought was sought most actively through caravan trading. There is certainly evidence
that some individuals entered into maritime trade, but there is as yet nothing to suggest
that these individuals were granted sufficient prestige amongst their peers for a strong
nautical tradition to develop at the societal level. Moreover, as Ma’in’s focus on
maritime trade only when it lost control of its land routes suggests, such a step was
certainly not preferred and possibly denigrated. This might be analogized to a modern
comparison of a Mercedes dealer as opposed to a used car salesman. Both individuals
might garner significant wealth, perhaps even trading in substantially the same product,
but the former is seen as more glamorous, and indeed prestigious, the latter being the butt
archetype of tackiness and low-class.
Small, coastal communities would have continued their own traditions of
gathering resources from the sea, fishing and perhaps even trading in luxury goods like
pearls and coral, but it is telling that they do not seem to have had the opportunity to
leave much of a mark in the archaeological record. The enduring material world of South
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Arabia was dedicated to agriculture and the power it provided over caravan routes.
Whether it was seen as low-class or merely lacked the preeminence, maritime trading was
ancillary to the point that it left little record. Moreover, as wealth was consolidated
inland, it would have made it that much more difficult for even whole communities to
gather the resources needed for private development of larger, ocean going craft. It is
true that during this time, maritime trade going around the peninsula was at a height, and
this was itself a source of great, in fact legendary, wealth for Southern Arabia but
maritime trade as a resource, continued to be something that came to al-Yemen, rather
than extended from it. It is probably for this reason that the Roman takeover of trade in
the Red Sea was met with such little resistance. In the first part, no substantial naval
body had been developed to resist action from this direction, and in the second, it had a
minimal impact on a people whose focus was in precisely the other direction. In fact,
given the Roman emphasis on nautical commerce, it probably only increased the flow of
goods passing through the coastal ports.
If a Roman takeover of shipping opportunities was hardly worth noticing
however, the attempt to grasp land was another thing entirely. The Axumite seizure of
actual territory struck the Southern Arabs to their core and when they were unable to
defend against this incursion on their own, the turned to their ancient inspiration, the east.
The fact that Persia was the current power in this direction is probably relatively
unimportant. What mattered on a very deep level was that it was the source of power at
the end of the great caravan routes and as we have seen, it would appear that the region
had, to some extent, always existed as a peripheral member of the eastern civilizations.
To the Southern Arabs, might, wealth, and perhaps the source of their own society, had
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always come from across the land, rather than the waves. Moreover, extension of Persian
control in the region allowed for maintenance of the land trade which had become
socially as well as economically engrained as the ‘proper’ measure of wealth for the
region. If some of the trade flowing past the region was lost, this would have the least
effect on the land-owning, caravan directing elites and in any case, Rome was supporting
their invaders, albeit in a most ambiguous fashion.
This reliance on Persia however, in the final days before Islam, only served to
further mitigate any maritime activity of the Southern Arabs. First, the preeminent trade
routes with the east remained open, thus the more important sources of commerce
continued. Second, Persia, was a vast and sprawling empire, in direct competition with
Rome and had good reason to quash economic relationships with her rival. Third, Persia
had her own successful and tested maritime forces, which could easily have served the
region as needed on both a commercial and military basis. In short, there was again no
encouragement or indeed, opportunity, for a maritime culture to arise as a segment of
Southern Arabian society in general. This point is perhaps all the more important
considering the questions which confront the scholar looking for a native Muslim element
in Islam’s earliest naval excursions. The Islamic armies that first brought the words of
Muhammad out of the Peninsula were based on the predominant social model in Arabian
society at the time, wherein the individual had a personal loyalty to their clan leaders. As
noted earlier, this model also prevailed in Southern Arabia, but it offered no place for
sailors. No clan leader represented a force on the waves, and thus any individual mariner
might be called upon to lend support to the Islamic cause, but not in such a way that their
nautical skills could be utilized. Seamen hailing from the Yemen were not organized
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socially, in a way that could be integrated into the greater Arab forces, thus this skill was
sought amongst the more or less willing representatives of recently conquered Greeks,
Copts and Egyptians, even while the fighting itself was left to the Arabs.
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Lagan
Hopefully, this paper underscores the conclusion that there has never been
anything to suggest an inherent, cultural aversion to the sea amongst the Southern Arabs.
The quotation attributed to Caliph Umar, even if it is accepted at face value, must be as,
at most, the expression of a single individual, and there are plenty of examples of
individuals who acted otherwise. This does not however, as some historians have argued,
support the idea that there was a strong tradition of Arab sailing prior to Islam’s move
into the Mediterranean basin. This must be very clear here: This paper does nothing to
dismiss the factual claims of previous historians working in this area, notably Fahmy and
Hourani, but it does seek to limit their conclusions, and perhaps redirect the focus of
further research in the general area.
Given the paucity of many historical records, there is an ingrained and perhaps
understandable bias held by may researches, that the tiniest shred of evidence is always
the tip of a greater iceberg, the merest reflection of what must have been a much larger
trend. If there is a reference to an Arab ship owner, surely this demonstrates a
widespread, enduring and vibrant maritime community. If an Arabian inscription is
found etched in Greece, no doubt it the single remnant of a thriving, island hopping
community. Hopefully, this paper has provided sufficient context of the cultural,
historical and geographical circumstances of Southern Arabia prior to the rise of Islam, to
show the unlikelihood that such communities existed, or perhaps, could exist in the
region. There was simply no support for this endeavor, either culturally, socially, or
indeed, geographically. It would seem indeed, that sometimes, an Arab ship owner, is
just an Arab ship owner.
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Of course, the desire among historians to find within any document a smoking
gun is not the sole reason that researchers have been so anxious to provide a tradition of
sailing amongst the Arabs. It was also in part to reverse the earlier assumptions regarding
their capabilities and aspirations. On the one hand, there was a cultural stereotype of
hydrophobic desert dwellers imposed by a variety of authors.85 On the other, there was
the perhaps, better intentioned, though no less misinformed, bias of writers who assumed
sea power, such a prominent component in the rise of the western, European powers,
must be inherent in any great power. To give credit to the Arabs for utilizing the sea was,
it seems, a misguided but respectful assumption. This bias is perhaps the more
interesting, as its relatively benign nature seems to have made it the more perfidious, and
in the end it may say far more about non-Arabs than the Arabs themselves.
There is a Sufi story which is worth paraphrasing here at some length:
A river once traveled a great distance, seeking its final destination. It
traveled over fields and down mountains, poured itself over cliffs, snaked its way
through canyons and wound between the massive trees of choking forests, until it
arrived at the desert and there, it could go no further. The more it dashed itself
against the sands, the more quickly it was soaked up, and the more prolonged its
efforts, the deeper the marsh it was creating became. Finally, in desperation, it
looked skyward and howled in frustration.
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The wind heard its howl and asked what was so distressing the river, and
when it heard the waters’ tale, it gave a soft laugh. “Relax,” said the wind, “and rise
up into my arms. I will carry you across the desert, so that you can continue your
journey.”
As soon as the river calmed itself, it was transformed into vapor, and the
wind was able to lift it in its arms and carry it across the desert, where it fell as rain
upon the other side. Gathering its strength, it became a rushing torrent once more
and was able to carry on toward its final home within the sea.86
The interesting thing about this story is the emphasis on both the difficulty and
ease of crossing the desert, not the sea. Taking to the water proved a great step forward
for many of the powers that arose in the west, and a view of the Arabs as hydrophobic
thus fit into their view of an inferior group as these powers extended control over much
of the Islamic World. In correcting this view though, there has been perhaps, a
misunderstanding: The Arabians were perfectly able to adapt to maritime practices when
the need arose, but this does not suggest a great nautical tradition inherent in their culture.
The need failed to arise because in their traditions, the desert was no great barrier to cross
or avoid, indeed it was itself a source of trade and wealth. Indeed, as Hourani noted,
travel by sea was, “no more formidable than the crossing of the deserts and mountains.”87
The emphasis of this statement though, has been misdirected. In choosing one way over
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the other, it is not the Arabs were afraid of the sea, but that outsiders to the Peninsula,
maintain perhaps to this day, a fear of the desert, a fear conquered by the region’s
inhabitants long, long ago.
At the very least then, perhaps the example of this paper can serve two purposes.
First, it places the potential ‘Arab seamen’ within their proper context, paradigms of
brave, capable and adaptable individuals, but not as exemplars of a hidden facet in
Southern Arabian society. Second, it is a good example of the limits of comparative
history. Southern Arabia looks so enticing as the home of a seafaring community.
Moreover, the rise of complex civilizations in the area seems to so closely mimic those of
nearby Mesopotamia, where strong maritime traditions did arise, that it is tempting to see
a lack of such development in the area as a lacuna in the historical record. In this case
however, more can be gleaned from looking at the record as it stands, and discovering
how a unique and singular society managed to have such an impact on the world around
it.

55

Bibliography
Askar, Abdullah. Al-Yamama, in the Early Islamic Era. Reading, Great Britain: Ithaca
Press in association with King Abdul Aziz Foundation for Research and Archives, 2002.
Bertman, Stephen. Handbook to Life in Ancient Mesopotamia. New York: Facts on
File, Inc., 2003.
Bolvin, Nicole and Dorian Q. Fuller. 2009. “Shell Middens, Ships and Seeds: Exploring
Coastal Subsistence, Maritime Trade and the Dispersal of Domesticates in and Around
the Ancient Arabian Peninsula”. Journal of World Prehistory. 22, no. 2: 113-180.
Breton, Jean-Francois. Arabia Felix from the Time of the Queen of Sheba: Eighth
Century B.C. to the First Century A.D. Translated by Albert LaFarge. Notre Dame,
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999.
Brummett, Palmira. Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of
Discovery. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1994.
Chaudhuri, K.N. Trade And Civilization In the Indian Ocean: An Economic History
from the Rise of Islam to 1750. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Curtin, Philip D. Cross-Cultural Trade in World History. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984.
Diakonoff, Igor. “Ancient Writing and Ancient Written Language: Pitfalls and
Peculiarities in the Study of Sumerian”. In Sumerological Studies in Honor of Thorkild
Jacobsen. Assyriological Studies 20, 99-121. 1976.
Dougherty, Raymond Philip. The Sealand of Ancient Arabia. Vol. 19 of Yale Oriental
Series. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932.
Fahmy, Aly Mohamed. Muslim Naval Organization. Cairo: National Publication &
Printing House, 1966.
_____. Muslim Sea-Power In the Eastern Mediterranean From the Seventh to the Tenth
Century A.D. Cairo: National Publication & Printing House, 1966.
Forêt, Philippe, and Andreas Kaplony. The Journey of Maps and Images on the Silk
Road. Leiden: Brill, 2008.
Hayes, John L. A Manual of Sumerian Grammar and Texts, Second Revised and
Expanded Edition. Undena Publications, Malibu, 2000.
Ho, Engseng. The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006.
56

Hodgson, Marshall G.S. The Venture of Islam. Chicago, The University of Chicago
Press, 1958.
Hourani, George F. Arab Seafaring, Expanded Edition. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1995.
Hoyland, Robert G. Arabia and the Arabs: From the Bronze Age to the coming of Islam.
London: Routledge, 2001.
Ḥusaynī, al-Ḥasan b. ’Alī. A Medieval administrative and fiscal treatise from the Yemen:
The Rasulid Mulakhkhaṣ al-fiṭan by al-Ḥasan b. ’Alī al-Ḥusaynī: a facsimile edition of
the Arabic text together with an introduction and annotated translation. Translated by G.
Rex Smith with additional material from the unpublished research of Claude Cahen and
R.B. Serjeant. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Ibn al-Mujāwir. A Traveller in Thirteenth-Century Arabia: Ibn al-Mujāwir’s Tārīkh alMustabṣir. Edited and translated by G. Rex Smith. Aldershot, Great Britain: Ashgate
Publishing Limited, 2008.
Johns, J. and E. Savage-Smith. 2003. "The Book of Curiosities: A Newly Discovered
Series of Islamic Maps". IMAGO MUNDI -AMSTERDAM-. no. 55: 7-24.
al-Kalā’ī, Sulaymān ibn Musa. Tarikh al-Ridda, gleaned from al-Iktifa of al-Balansi.
Edited and translated by Khurshid Ahmad Fariq. New Delhi: Indian Institute of Islamic
Studies, 1970.
Khalilieh, Hassan S. Islamic Maritime Law, An Introduction. Edited by Ruud Peters and
Bernard Weiss. Vol. 5 of Studies in Islamic Law and Society. Leiden: Brill, 1998.
Knapp, A. Bernard. 1992. “Bronze Age Mediterranean Island Cultures and the Ancient
Near East”. The Biblical Archaeologist. 55, no. 2: 52-72.
Lewis, Archibald R. Naval Power and Trade in the Mediterranean, A.D. 500 – 1100.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951.
Mackintosh-Smith, Tim. Yemen: The Unknown Arabia. Woodstock: The Overlook
Press, 2000.
Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirouz. 2005. "’Boundary’ in ancient Persian tradition of statehood".
GeoJournal. 62, no. 1/2: 51-58.
Noth, Albrecht. The Early Arabic Historical Tradition: A Source-Critical Study. 2nd ed.
(in collaboration with Lawrence I. Conrad. Translated by Michael Bonner. Princeton:
The Darwin Press, Inc., 1994.

57

Parpola, Simo, Asko Parpola and Robert H. Brunswig, Jr. 1977. “The Meluḫḫa Village:
Evidence of Acculturation of Harappan Traders in Late Third Millennium
Mesopotamia?” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient. 20, no. 2:
129-165.
Potts, D. T. From Prehistory to the Fall of the Achaemenid Empire. Vol. 1 of The
Arabian Gulf in Antiquity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Retsö, Jan. The Arabs in Antiquity: Their History from the Assyrians to the Umayyads.
London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.
Risso, Patricia. Merchants & Faith: Muslim Commerce and Culture in the Indian
Ocean. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995.
Rogerson, Barnaby. The Heirs of Muhammad: Islam’s First Century and the Origins of
the Sunni-Shia Split. Woodstock: The Overlook Press, 2007.
Schippmann, Klaus. Ancient South Arabia: From the Queen of Sheba to the Advent of
Islam. Translated by Allison Brown. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2001.
Schoff, Wilfred H., trans. The Periplus of the Erythræan Sea: Travel and Trade in the
Indian Ocean by a Merchant of the First Century. New York: Longmans, Green, and
Co., 1912.
Seland, Eivind Heldaas. 2005. “Ancient South Arabia: trade and strategies of state
control as seen in the “Periplus Maris Erythraei””. Proceedings of the Seminar for
Arabian Studies. 35: 271-278.
Serjeant, R. B. Customary and Shari'ah Law in Arabian Society. Hampshire, Great
Britain: Variorum, 1991.
_____. Farmers and Fishermen in Arabia. Edited by G. Rex Smith. Aldershot, Great
Britain: Variorum, 1995.

Shah, Idries. Tales of the Dervishes: Teaching Stories of the Sufi Masters Over the Past
Thousand Years. Arkana: Penguin, 1993.
Stein, Gil J. 2002. “From Passive Periphery to Active Agents: Emerging Perspectives in
the Archaeology of Interregional Interaction”. American Anthropologist, New Series.
104, no. 3: 903-916.
Steinberg, Philip E. The Social Construction of the Ocean. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001.

58

Stieglitz, Robert R. 1984. “Long-Distance Seafaring in the Ancient Near East”. The
Biblical Archaeologist. 47, no. 3: 131-142.

59

